In this paper we study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and cost-reducing effort
Introduction
The key tenet of many reforms of the health care sector has been to introduce incentives for improving efficiency without losing quality of care. For this purpose, in the last decades many OECD countries reformed the providers payment system, introducing fairly anywhere some form of prospective payment system and reducing the scope for global budgeting, with the aim of increasing the competition in the market and, thus, quality and efficiency. In this setting, prices are usually regulated and fixed and providers compete on quality to attract patients.
However, while the effect on efficiency would seem to be confirmed by the data, the empirical findings on hospital quality are ambiguous and far from being well-established. For instance, several studies reports that prospective payment reduces costs and length of stay relative to fee for service (Rosenberg and Browne, 2001 ).
The effects on quality of care, in settings that introduced fixed price like DRG style system, offer a less clear cut picture although mostly empirical evidence finds that competition with fixed prices does not erode quality and outcome.
1 Nonetheless, the empirical literature on these effects is remarkably narrow and for most countries the empirical evidence on the effects of introduction prospective payment system remains very limited (Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff, 2011) . The main empirical studies that try to assess these effects are relative to USA and look, for instance, at the impact of the change in Medicare hospital payment system, from a cost plus to a prospective per case payment. Early studies (Davis and Rhodes, 1988) compared Medicare patients before and after the implementation of per case payment. The authors reported that per case payment reduced hospitalization and length of stay, although mortality and readmission rate did not increase. Kahn et al. (1990) also documented that length of stay decreased by 24%, although 180 -day risk-adjusted mortality and readmission rate remained unchanged. Conversely, in a large influence study, Cutler (1995) examined mortality and readmission rate of Medicare patients, and found that while 1-year mortality rate remained unchanged, readmission rate increased. However, the author point out that, the increased readmission rate appeared to reflect accounting changes in hospitals, rather than true changes in morbidity.
Hospital readmissions and their preventability have been the subject of a large debate since the introduction of per case payment. Even if some readmissions cannot be avoided, low readmission rates are among the indicators that are often used as a proxy measure for good inpatient care quality (Ashton et al., 1997) . Although the empirical evidence about the relationship between readmission rates and the adoption of a prospective per case payment tends to be inconclusive, in recent years there is a large interest in introducing incentives for hospitals to avoid post discharge complications that were potentially preventable. In USA a large effort has been put on introducing arrangements of "bundled payments" across multiple providers so as to avoid the lack of incentives, in traditional provider-specific payment systems, to coordinate care, considered as one the major causes of high readmission rates for Medicare beneficiaries (MEDPAC, 2008; McCellan, 2011) . Moreover, the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP), designed with the objectives of reducing readmissions by aligning payment with outcome, introduces a system of penalty in Medicare base reimbursements system for hospitals underperforming in a selected number of risk-adjusted 30-day readmission rate (Adashi and Kocher, 2011) . Also in other institutional settings, we can find incentives to prevent high readmission rates in prospective per case payment. For instance, in Germany, hospitals have an incentive to avoid readmissions because they will not receive additional reimbursement for cases readmitted for the same cause within 30 days of the initial admission (Geissler et al., 2011) . A similar rule has been recently introduced in NHS (Department of Health, 2011).
In this paper we study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and cost-reducing effort under different payment regimes, either a global budgeting or a prospective payment system. In addition, we also consider the role played by financial incentives directly linked to some measure of outcome, such as readmissions, like in a pay-for-performance system. While this feature of the payment system would not seem important for inducing cost-reducing effort, this turns out to be particularly crucial in driving the provision of quality in the treatment. We consider the analysis of the effects of different reimbursement systems within a context characterized by competition among hospitals and by the existence of non-financial incentives for providers. We, therefore, set up a model that allows for comparing different payment systems in terms of incentives for efficiency and quality. As far as the specific results about the incentives to provide quality are concerned, we find that prospective payment systems do not necessarily perform better than retrospective systems if the reimbursement to hospitals is not adjusted to take into account specific measures of quality, such as readmissions. More specifically, within the setting of our model, if patients readmitted are fully paid to hospitals, moving from global budgeting to a prospective payment system might even induce a reduction on quality and, in turn, an increase in readmission probability. However, if the prospective payment system is adjusted for internalizing this counter-incentive, by a different payment for patients readmitted, it could be able to foster a higher hospital quality through the competition channel.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The setup of the model is laid out in section 2. Section 3 develops the equilibrium results and their comparison across the different reimbursement systems. Section 4 contains a social welfare analysis of the results of the model and section 5 provides with some concluding remarks.
Model
In this section we introduce the main structure of the model. In line with the previous literature on hospital competition (e.g. Beitia, 2003 , Brekke et al., 2008 , the analysis of providers' behaviour is conducted in the framework of the Hotelling spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929) , where we study a market for medical treatment with two hospitals located at the either end of the unit line S = [0, 1]. We consider providers location as exogenously given, which indeed is somewhat reasonable for the case of healthcare providers. On the line segment S there is a uniform distribution of patients, with density normalised to 1, each demanding only one medical treatment. As fairly realistic for this market, patients do not pay for the treatment they get, rather they mind only for the quality of those. Assuming full market coverage, that is each patient does not have an attractive outside option, all patients simply choose which hospital to demand from. The utility of a patient located at ‫ݔ‬ ∈ ܵ and receiving treatment from hospital i, located at z i , is given by
where ‫ݒ‬ is the gross valuation from medical treatment, ‫ݍ‬ ‫ݍ‬ is the treatment quality at hospital i, ߟ is the parameter measuring the marginal utility of quality and ߬ is the transportation cost parameter. The lower bound ‫ݍ‬ represents the lowest treatment quality hospitals are allowed to offer, implying that if ‫ݍ‬ ൏ ‫ݍ‬ then i might lose his licence. Without loss of generality, we set ‫ݍ‬ ൌ 0. Moreover, as standard in this literature (e.g. Brekke et al. 2012) we normalise the marginal utility of treatment quality to one, ߟ ൌ 1, implying that now ߬ can be interpreted as the marginal disutility of travelling relative to treatment quality.
The patient who is indifferent between provider i and provider j can be implicitly characterised by his location ‫ݔ‬
yielding, given the assumption of uniform patients distribution with density 1, the demand for hospital i
On the other hand, the demand for hospital j is simply the complement to 1, that is
Therefore, if hospitals offer the same treatment quality they exactly halve the market. Differently, the hospital with a higher treatment quality gets a market share more than half. Finally, the extent to which the difference in treatment quality affects the hospital market share strictly depends on the marginal disutility of travelling relative to quality ߬. In particular, a high ߬ implies that the disutility of travelling is more important for patients than quality, making demand less responsive to change in quality. Indeed, even if we do not restrict explicitly the value of ߬, in our interpretation we will favour a value of ߬ ≅ 1 2 .
Hospitals are financed by a third-party payer potentially either retrospectively or prospectively. Since we specify both cases later in the paper, here we introduce the general form of the objective function. As mentioned in the introduction, despite the empirical relevance of readmissions, in the existing literature the explicit role of patients readmission is usually neglected. Differently, in this paper we attach much importance on the way in which readmissions affect the incentive provided by different hospitals payment systems. Therefore, we consider explicitly revenue and cost of readmissions in the hospital profit. Moreover, as discussed by different papers in the literature (e.g. Ellis, 1998 , Harrison and Lybecker, 2005 , Brekke et al., 2011 , despite financial incentives actually receive the lion's share of the interest, it is recognized that non-financial incentives might be especially relevant in the health care market where the relationship between patient and provider is essentially based on trust. Therefore, we consider these non-financial motivations as relevant in driving providers' behaviour.
Accordingly, the objective function of hospital i is assumed to be given by
where T is a potential lump-sum transfer and p is a prospectively regulated price per-treatment. The cost of medical treatments is given by the cost function ‫ݔ‪ሺ‬ܥ‬ , ‫ݍ‬ ሻ, assumed increasing and convex both in output and quality, plus some fixed cost F
While the marginal cost for quality ݇ is equal for both hospitals, the treatment marginal cost ܿ can be reduced by each hospital exerting a cost-reducing effort ݁ , which to some extent should allow us to capture the incentive provided by different payment systems on cost-efficiency. In particular, a positive cost-reducing effort implies a reduction on cost given by ܿ ൌ ߪ െ ݁ . Nonetheless, whenever hospitals exert a positive cost-reducing effort, they incur a managerial disutility
consider also a potential managerial disutility induced by a higher quality క ଶ ‫ݍ‬ ଶ , aiming to capture the fact that the quality of medical treatment is not only a money matter but also a diligence matter.
Each patient treated by hospitals has a positive probability of being readmitted, governed by a certain severity index h. However, this probability can be consistently reduced by a high quality treatment. In particular, the probability of being readmitted is assumed to be given by
Therefore, knowing that ‫ݍ‬ ൌ 0 is the lowest hospital quality standard to be licensed, the severity index h represents the lower bound readmission probability for each patient 3 . Whenever a patient is readmitted hospitals incur a readmission cost R, thought to be somewhat smaller than the marginal cost at the admission. On the other hand, contingent on the payment system, hospitals receive a payment, which in a prospective system is strictly related to the parameter ߣ ∈ ሾ0, 1ሿ. In particular, when ߣ ൌ 1 hospitals receive a full per-treatment price as for the first admission, whereas when ߣ ൌ 0 hospitals receive nothing and, thus, they suffer all the readmission cost. Therefore, the parameter ߣ can be interpreted as the degree of risk sharing in the system relative to readmission.
It is evident that, whenever the risk of readmission is discharged entirely to provider (ߣ ൌ 0), there is an incentive for hospitals to avoid somehow to readmit patients. Nonetheless, in the first part of the paper we assume that hospitals are not able to make rationing. Even if this might be somewhat unreasonable, this allows us to highlight the main role played by the readmission policy in driving providers' behaviour and, in turn, the equilibrium quality under PPS. Then, in the final part of the paper we discuss explicitly the occurrence of hospitals rationing.
Finally, we include explicitly the non-financial motivation of provider ‫ݍ‪൫‬ܤߙ‬ , ‫ݔ‬ ൯, with the parameter ߙ 0 governing its relative weight in the provider objective function. The main idea behind this non-financial part is that offering a high quality medical treatment gives hospital staff a high social and professional status which, in turn, gives them a higher non-monetary utility. Therefore, the assumptions we consider reasonable to make are that ‫ܤ‬ 0, ‫ܤ‬ ௫ ವ 0 and ‫ܤ‬ ,௫ ವ 0. In particular, for the sake of simplicity we assume that the provider non-financial motivation is given by
In what follows we will consider the simultaneous game where each hospital chooses independently his treatment quality ‫ݍ‬ and his cost-reducing effort ݁ , in order to maximise his objective function. In particular, we will firstly derive the hospital reaction-curves to study the kind of strategic interaction is induced by different payment systems and, then, we will look for the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Finally, we will move towards a welfare analysis to derive the main implication of the model in terms of different payment systems and, in particular, in terms of hospital readmission policy.
Nash equilibrium
In the general formulation, the hospital i's maximization problem is given by
where Ω is given by (5), with T and p depending on the hospital payment system under consideration. The solution to this maximization problem is given by the two FOC
In the following, we will consider two standard hospital payment systems: retrospective payment system and prospective payment system 5 . Later on, we will show that the specification of the risk sharing readmission policy (ߣ) has crucial implications with respect to the comparison of the two payment systems.
Retrospective payment system
In a basic retrospective payment system hospitals do not receive a predetermined price for any patient they treat, rather they are fully reimbursed according to how much cost they already faced. Therefore, the hospital revenue is given only by a retrospective lump-sum transfer, that is
Inserting (11) and (12) in the hospital objective function (5) yields
Applying the FOC to the objective function (13) we have
From the reaction curve (14) we can see that, as long as the weight of the non-financial motivation is not so high 6 , in a retrospective payment system hospitals act as strategic substitute in quality. To grasp the intuition for this result we should consider that in a retrospective payment system there are not "financial" incentives to increase quality for attracting more patients; rather, providers' behaviour is more driven by the "non-financial motivation", as (13) clearly shows. Therefore, when the quality of j is low then hospital i has a scope for increasing quality, because the marginal managerial disutility is low. But if provider j increases quality, then hospital i might find too costly in terms of managerial disutility to keep up with j. Thus, once behind the competitor hospital i might even find optimal to reduce quality.
Similarly, from (15) we can see that in a retrospective payment system there is no scope for exerting a positive cost-reducing effort. Again, the intuition is that in such kind of system providers' behaviour is more driven by the non-financial motivation, which has to do with the quality of medical treatment but not much with the cost-efficiency. 5 Indeed, there are at least two different general payment systems ascribed to prospective, that is the prospective budget allocation (e.g. Austria, Portugal, Spain) and prospective case payment (e.g. in England, France, Germany, the US). However, as usual in this literature we consider the prospective payment system in the meaning of the prospective case payment. 6 Notice that the SOC for this maximization problem reads
Not surprisingly when the non-financial utility is significantly high, in a payment system where all costs are reimbursed, there is an unlimited incentive for increasing quality. Nonetheless, we prefer to rule out this case on one hand because it is somewhat unreasonable, on the other hand because it eliminates any scope for the analysis of the incentives provided by the different payment systems.
Finally, solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium we find
Analysing the comparative statics properties of (16), they are quite reasonable and intuitive. In particular, a higher weight of the non-financial motivation in the provider objective function ሺߙሻ leads to a higher equilibrium quality. On the other hand, a higher marginal managerial disutility of quality ሺߦሻ and a higher marginal disutility of travelling relative to treatment quality ሺ߬ሻ, implying a lower demand responsiveness to change in quality, lead to a lower equilibrium quality.
Prospective payment system
Differently, in a prospective payment system hospitals receive a prospectively regulated price for any patient they treat, plus potentially some fixed lump-sum transfer aiming often to cover the fixed cost. Therefore, in this case the hospital revenue is given by
Inserting (18) and (19) in the hospital objective function (5) yields
Differently from (13), we notice that in a prospective system, not only the "non-financial", but also the "financial" part of provider objective function depends on the level of medical treatment quality and cost-reducing effort. Looking at the reaction curve (21), we can see that in a prospective payment system, as long as the weight of the non-financial motivation is not so high, hospitals act as strategic complement in quality. The main intuition is that in a prospective payment system hospitals revenue strictly depends on the actual number of patients they treat. Therefore, it gives providers a consistent financial incentive to keep up with the level of treatment quality to avoid losing demand, which indeed represents the essential stimulus provided by competition in a market with regulated price.
Similarly, from (22) we see that the presence of a fixed payment for patient treated also provides the incentive for hospitals to exert a positive cost-reducing effort, in order to reduce the marginal cost and, in turn, to increase the profit margin.
Then, applying symmetry to (21) and (22) 
Differently from the previous case, the comparative statics of the equilibrium quality (23) are quite interesting. In particular, we can notice from (25) that, as long as the degree of risk sharing (ߣ) is consistently greater than zero, a higher fixed payment ‫)(‬ might even reduce the equilibrium quality.
Likewise, from (26) we see that a higher degree of risk sharing (ߣ) reduces fairly unambiguously the equilibrium quality. This constitutes the first main result of the paper. 
Proposition 1. In a prospective payment system the higher is the degree of risk sharing relative to readmission, the lower is the equilibrium quality.
The main intuition for this result is that when patients readmitted are costly for hospitals, that is ߣ is low, and the probability of readmission depends on the quality of treatment, there is a clear incentive in PPS for increasing quality to reduce readmissions. On the other hand, when hospitals receive a higher payment for patients readmitted, the higher revenue increases the attractiveness of readmissions and, to the limit, there might be a scope for reducing quality to increase readmissions and, in turn, the revenue.
To some extent, since the majority of the actual PPS do not provide explicitly for a readmission policy, implying that hospitals receive a full payment for patients readmitted, the Proposition 1 might be extremely useful in offering an easy instrument to induce a higher quality of medical treatment.
Finally, the other comparative statics of (23) are more expected. In particular, a higher weight of the non-financial motivation (ߙ) and a higher competition (߬) lead to a higher equilibrium quality. On the other hand, a higher marginal managerial disutility of quality (ߦ) and higher marginal costs (ߢ) and (c) lead to a lower equilibrium quality. Finally, from (24) we see that a higher marginal managerial disutility of effort ‫)ݓ(‬ reduces the equilibrium cost-reducing effort.
Payment systems comparison
In this section we compare the equilibrium values of the two payment systems. From (27) we can see that the comparison of the equilibrium cost-reducing effort between RPA and PPS highlights unambiguously the advantage of PPS in terms of cost-efficiency.
The main intuition is that in a payment system with price established prospectively, hospitals enjoy entirely the increased profit margin associated with a reduction in the marginal cost, since the greater hospital efficiency does not imply a reduction in the revenue. Differently, in a system where reimbursement is established retrospectively, there is not any incentive for hospitals in reducing costs, since all the reduction is enjoyed by the third-party payer.
Differently, from (28) we can see that the comparison of the equilibrium quality between RPS and PPS is quite ambiguous and, indeed, strictly depends on the parameter values. Moreover, since the impact of the fixed price on the equilibrium quality in PPS is also ambiguous (25), even an increase of ‫‬ does not imply unconditionally a higher equilibrium quality in PPS respect to RPS. Therefore, the propulsive role of competition induced by a prospective payment system might not be enough to induce a higher treatment quality.
However, since a higher degree of risk sharing (ߣ) decreases unambiguously the equilibrium quality in PPS (26), whereas has not impact on RPS, we can certainly maintain that should exist a potential role for PPS in inducing a higher equilibrium quality, this would certainly be curbed by a higher ߣ.
To shed more light on this comparison, in Figure 1 we show the reaction curves and, in turn, the equilibrium quality under RPS and PPS resulting by a simulation with the same parameter values. In particular, since the actual PPS often do not provide explicitly for a readmission policy implying a different payment, we start our numerical exercise considering a full payment for patients readmitted (ߣ ൌ 1).
Fig. 1. Reaction curves and equilibrium quality under RPS and PPS
As we can notice, whereas in RPS the presence of competitors in the healthcare market induces a reduction in the equilibrium quality, PPS is indeed able to convert the kind of strategic interaction between providers and, therefore, there seems to be a potential role for competition in stimulating a higher equilibrium quality. However, as Figure 1 shows this propulsive role might not be enough to guarantee unconditionally a higher equilibrium quality in the market and, in particular, the presence of a full readmission payment might significantly frustrate its propulsive effect. This result is summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2. As long as the probability of readmission depends on the quality of treatment and hospitals receive a full payment for patients readmitted, a prospective payment system might even induce a reduction in quality and, in turn, an increase in readmission probability.
To some extent, the content of Proposition 2 could explain the large empirical evidence of the impact of the introduction of PPS on quality. As we noted in the introduction of the paper, while the evidence on cost-efficiency would seem to highlight the advantage of PPS, the empirical findings on hospital quality are still quite ambiguous. Indeed, considering that the actual PPS often do not provide explicitly for a readmission policy implying a different payment readmitted (ߣ ൌ 1), Figure 1 might represent exactly the ambiguity we find in the data.
On the other hand, Proposition 2 gives rise to the fair question if such limitation of the effect of competition might be internalized in the payment system by a different readmission policy. Therefore, in Figure 2 we report the PPS equilibrium quality under different readmission policies. In particular, the picture on the left represents the equilibrium quality in a PPS paying the 80% of the full price for patients readmitted; the picture on the right the equilibrium quality in a PPS does not paying anything.
Fig. 2. Readmission policy and equilibrium quality under PPS
From the picture on the left, notice that even a small reduction in the readmission payment is enough to allow the propulsive role of competition to do the job. More generally, Figure 2 shows that the bigger is the reduction in the readmission payment, the higher is the equilibrium quality under PPS. This constitutes the content of the next proposition.
Proposition 3. The propulsive role of competition induced by a prospective payment system should be more successful in driving a higher equilibrium quality in those systems providing for a lower degree of risk sharing relative to readmission.
The aim of this comparison has been to identify the different incentives given by the two payment systems to providers' behaviour. In particular, we established that, as long as hospitals receive a high payment for patients readmitted, the propulsive role of competition induced by PPS might not be enough to ensure a higher equilibrium quality respect to RPS. On the other hand, PPS should be successful in driving a higher equilibrium quality whenever the readmission policy provides for a low degree of risk sharing.
However, at this stage nothing ensures neither that the equilibrium quality induced by PPS would be indeed the first-best quality, nor that the first-best quality can be really achieved under PPS by some optimal policy instrument regulation. Therefore, in the next section we move on to the welfare analysis in order to answer to these crucial questions. In particular, in what follows we will try to emphasize mainly the role of the optimal readmission policy as an instrument in the context of a prospective payment system to induce the first-best quality.
Social Welfare
Following the previous literature, we define social welfare as the sum of consumer utility net of monetary costs as well as disutility costs. In addition, we include the non-financial utility of providers, which clearly disappears whenever ߙ ൌ 0. Therefore, the social welfare function is given by
First-best policy
We start out by deriving the first-best cost-reducing efforts and qualities. Maximising (29) with respect to cost-reducing efforts and qualities yields
Looking at (30), we see that the first-best cost-reducing effort depends negatively only on the marginal disutility of effort ‫.)ݓ(‬ Concerning the first-best quality (31), on one hand higher monetary (ߢ) and disutility costs (ߦ) reduce it; on the other hand, higher provider non-financial utility (ߙ) and expected readmission costs (Rh) lead to a higher first-best quality.
Furthermore, the comparison between (24) and (30) Differently, the comparison between (23) and (31) reveals that the equilibrium quality under PPS is not generally equal to the first-best quality, that is ‫ݍ‬ ് ‫ݍ‬ * . Nonetheless, from (23) we know that the regulator has two policy instruments to implement the first-best quality level, the fixed price (p) and the degree of risk sharing relative to readmission (ߣ). Indeed, the more usual regulation considered in the literature is to choose the price to induce the equilibrium quality equal to the first-best quality. Nonetheless, as expected the addition of the readmission policy as an instrument on regulator's hands, adds some degree of freedom to the optimal policy design.
Looking at the first instrument, the optimal price regulation ‫‬ * is implicitly characterized by
Thus, in principle the first-best quality can be implemented in PPS by the optimal price regulation. However, notice that such optimal price depends on the degree of risk sharing relative to readmission. Therefore, the regulator does not have a unique optimal price to induce the first-best quality, but in principle he has a bundle of optimal policies made by all possible couples ‫,(‬ ߣ) given by (32). Interestingly, from (33) we see that the optimal price inducing the first-best quality has to be higher when the degree of risk sharing is higher. This central result is resumed in Proposition 5. Proposition 5. To induce the first-best quality, the optimal price has to be higher in those systems with a higher degree of risk sharing relative to readmission.
The intuition behind this result can be appreciated by the combination of (25) and (26). From the former we know that an increase in price ‫)(‬ does not induce unconditionally a higher equilibrium quality ‫ݍ(‬ ) and, in particular, as long as the degree of risk sharing (ߣ) is consistently greater than zero, a higher fixed payment might even lead to a reduction in the equilibrium quality. From the latter we know that, regardless the price, a higher degree of risk sharing (ߣ) reduces fairly unambiguously the equilibrium quality ‫ݍ(‬ ). Therefore, a higher degree of risk sharing not only reduces per se the equilibrium quality, but also reduces the marginal effect of the per-treatment price. On the contrary, a lower degree of risk sharing not only allows to the price instrument to do more effectively its job, but also helps to induce a higher quality through its own effect on it.
Thus, in implementing the optimal policy design in healthcare market the regulator not only can induce the first-best quality, but can also choose a couple of policy instruments to try to reduce the monetary cost of the policy. In particular, to the extent that all optimal policies in the bundle ‫,(‬ ߣ) given by (32) are socially indifferent, we define the first-best policy that couple of policy instruments ‫,(‬ ߣ) in the bundle minimising the cost of public funds. Therefore, conditional on the hospitals inability to rationing, the first-best policy is simply given by The main intuition for being (34) and (35) the first-best policy is that with a null risk sharing, that is ߣ ൌ 0, readmissions become extremely costly for hospitals and, thus, there is the strongest possible incentive for increasing quality to reduce readmissions. Correspondently, the optimal price given by (35) represents indeed the lowest possible price still able to induce the first-best quality in the market.
In principle, the result contained in Proposition 6 might offer to healthcare policy makers a valid instrument not only to induce the first-best quality in the market, but also to implement the policy in the cheapest way. To some extent, the feature of the first-best policy to minimise the cost of public funds should be extremely important, as it is well-recognised that there is a strictly positive cost from collecting money through some form of distortionary taxation. Moreover, even in case policy makers would not be able to implement such policy, the principle underpinning the result in Proposition 5 is still valid: that is, the lower is the degree of risk sharing, the lower is the price needed to induce the first-best quality.
Second-best policy
Although the first-best policy (34) and (35) are in principle implementable, there are different reasons why they might not be optimal in practice. First, notice that all normative results have been derived conditional on the hospitals inability to rationing. However, as we already observed this assumption might be somewhat unreasonable, since hospitals do have instruments to try to put in practice some form of rationing. Therefore, the first-best policy (ߣ * ൌ 0) might be extremely risky, inducing hospitals to avoid somehow to readmit those patients requiring a new treatment. Moreover, for political and economic reasons, it might be difficult for the government to stand by such readmission policy. Last but not least, in those countries using PPS the per-treatment price is usually set according to the treatment average cost and, indeed, it might be extremely difficult to implement all calculations required by the first-best price.
In those plausible cases where one or more of these conditions are significant, the first-best policy might not be feasible or optimal. Therefore, one should try to find some policy design feasible and easy to implement, but still able to produce the required effect to induce the first-best quality. Indeed, the results of this paper would seem to suggest a plausible route.
The principle underpinning our main results is that the readmission policy does influence providers' behaviour on quality by offering a revenue (ߣ ோ ) or imposing a cost (ߣ ൏ ோ ). In particular, we found that a lower degree of risk sharing not only reduces the equilibrium quality, but also reduces the optimal price needed to induce the first-best quality. Therefore, a fairly reasonable second-best readmission policy might be
On one hand, this readmission policy does eliminate the economic attractiveness of readmissions induced by a full payment (ߣ ൌ 1); on the other hand, it does eliminate the scope for hospitals to make rationing induced by the first-best policy (ߣ * ൌ 0). Finally, it should be both politically and economically sustainable for government and health providers.
Looking at the second-best price, notice that the optimal price (32) implied by (36) would be
Nonetheless, the implementation of (37) still would require different calculations which, indeed, might be difficult and arbitrary. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, a fairly reasonable alternative might be
On one hand, respect to the standard average cost-based rule, the implementation of (38) should be extremely simple, requiring just the calculation of the average readmission cost (R) and the average severity index (h). On the other hand, respect to the theoretical optimal price (37), we are neglecting a bit adding (߬) and a bit subtracting (െߙ), which might somehow compensate and, thus, reduce the extent of the approximation, with the crucial advantage of making the implementation extremely easier.
To resume, a reasonable and very easy to implement second-best policy might be
More generally, we have seen from Figure 2 that even a reduction of ߣ different from (34) or (39) might be able to produce a significant effect in terms of higher quality. Thus, those countries providing a full payment for patients readmitted (ߣ ൌ 1) might be still able to get a significant effect in terms of higher quality and, in turn, lower readmission rates even without providing necessarily for the first-best policy (ߣ * ൌ 0) or the second-best policy (ߣ * ൌ ோ ). Therefore, at least for those medical sectors where the severity index is not negligible, the theoretical results underlined in this paper and the associated policy recommendations represent certainly a valid contribution for both scholars and policy makers.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and cost-reducing effort under different payment regimes, either a retrospective global budgeting or a prospective payment system. In particular, we have conducted our analysis within the spatial Hotelling framework where two hospitals compete to attract a larger demand in the market for medical treatment. Differently from the existing literature we focus on the role played by the readmission policy in driving providers' behaviour and, in turn, in leading to the equilibrium quality in the market.
In our analysis we find that the propulsive role of competition provided by a prospective payment system might not be enough to guarantee unconditionally a higher equilibrium quality respect to a retrospective system. In particular, as long as the probability of readmission depends on the quality of treatment and hospitals receive a full payment for patients readmitted, a prospective payment system might even induce a reduction in quality and, in turn, an increase in readmission probability. This result gives rise to the question if such limitation of the effect of competition could be internalized in the payment system by a different readmission policy. Therefore, in the final part of the paper we have explored the impact of different readmission policies with the aim of adjusting this counter-incentive. This leads us to the central result of our paper, if the prospective payment system is adjusted by a different payment for patients readmitted, it could be able to foster a higher hospital quality through the competition channel.
In conclusion, in this paper we have shown the important role played by a distinct design feature, that is the readmission policy, in adjusting the incentives provided by a prospective payment system. In particular, we have seen that even a small reduction in the readmission payment should allow the propulsive role of competition to produce a significant effect in terms of quality. Overall, we want to emphasize our main message that, despite the growing concern about quality, a prospective payment system with the right design features, as the right readmission policy, could indeed be able to induce a higher quality in the market. In this perspective, the focus on the readmission policy reflects our believe that it is crucial feature of the payment system in driving providers' behaviour and, in turn, the quality of health services. Nonetheless, it represents only one of the possible financial mechanisms might be implemented to make prospective payment systems well-behave. Thus, moving from this perspective we hope that in the next years further research will be successful in identifying such optimal design for the health payment system.
